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Thinking, listening and the true dialogue

Thinking, listening and the true dialogue

“One of the most sophisticated ways of thinking is listening, provided that it is not confused with ”obeying.” It is not enough just to lend an ear; it is necessary to resist the temptation to surrender to the voice of another simply because it sounds firm, confident, or, worse still, laden with prestige. Never forget that authority, on its own, is not an argument. Not even when the speaker speaks with the confidence that comes from experience or the charisma that engenders recognition. Quite the contrary: the more compelling the words, the greater the listener’s critical vigilance must be. Accepting a statement simply because it comes from an admired or revered source is a form of silent capitulation, a discreet abdication of one’s own judgment which, far from bringing one closer to knowledge, turns it into an act of imitation. And imitation—as Montaigne well knew—does not enlighten: it diminishes.
Reflection, when genuine, is not transmitted as a recipe or imposed as a doctrine. What is offered here is not a closed, definitive truth, but an open provocation. Listening should not be understood as immediate adherence, but as a willingness to try out what has been heard: to put it to the test, to let it resonate in the specific matter of a concrete life. And it is there, in the very body of existential experience, that any idea reveals its fruitfulness or its fragility. It is not, therefore, a matter of confirming what another has said, nor of adopting their voice as one’s own, but of passing that voice through the sieve of singularity: of turning what has been received into something thought from within oneself.
The musical example is not accidental. The score can be shared, but the interpretation—as any honest performer knows—never is. The same note played on different instruments produces different timbres, unexpected accents, silences with their own depth. So it is with thought: the same idea, when it passes through another biography, another character, another rhythm of life, no longer sounds the same. The authenticity of judgment does not lie in the originality of the content, but in the fidelity to that intimate modulation that only one person can give. I am not speaking, then, from a pulpit, from a throne. I am not trying to guide, teach, preach, or dictate; I am speaking from the partial and contingent place that constitutes me. My words do not claim universality, but sincerity and honesty. It is permeated by what is happening inside me. If anything I say resonates with the reader, it will not be because we share a doctrine, but because there has been, perhaps, a coincidence between differences. But even at that point of intersection, the distance remains: you are not me, nor could I ever speak from your place. That distance is not an obstacle. It is not an imperfection to be corrected or a hindrance that prevents us from approaching the truth. Quite the contrary: it is its most basic premise. Thinking is not seeking fusion between voices, but learning to sustain disagreement without severing the link. Real dialogue does not consist of reaching a sterile consensus, but of accepting that any truth worthy of the name is affirmed in the midst of plurality, and not in spite of it.”
Prabhuji
Friendship and companionship

Friendship and companionship

“Friendship, far from being reduced to a spontaneous affinity or mutual attraction of temperaments, constitutes a relational experience that engages fundamental structures of the psyche. From a psychoanalytic perspective, it involves not only conscious bonds, but also unconscious displacements that shape its complexity. Sigmund Freud, in Zur Einführung des Narzißmus (1914), argues that the beloved object—and by analogy, the friend—can constitute a projection of the ideal self. In this sense, friendship can be read as a form of transformed narcissism: the friend is chosen not only for their manifest qualities, but for what they embody of the unconscious desire for an idealized image of completeness. However, an exclusively narcissistic interpretation is reductive. Melanie Klein introduced a fundamental distinction between partial object relations and total object relations. While the former involve the fragmentation of the object according to partial drives, the latter imply the ability to recognize the totality of the other, including their contradictory aspects. Genuine friendship, as a total object relationship, requires accepting the ambivalence inherent in all human bonds: love and hostility, the desire for fusion and the need for separation, proximity and distance. In this context, the friend is not a mirror image, but an autonomous subject whose difference cannot always be integrated without conflict.
The authenticity of friendship is therefore measured by its capacity to sustain otherness. Jacques Lacan points out that the other is not simply what complements the self, but what introduces a point of irreducible opacity. The friend, as a symbolically constituted other, cannot be reduced to a mirror function. True friendship involves transcending narcissism, not remaining fixed in it.
Listening, in this context, takes on a structuring value. It is not a matter of interpreting or resolving, but of sustaining the other’s words without appropriation or judgment. Donald Winnicott, when speaking of “good enough presence,” describes a way of being that does not invade or demand immediate reciprocity. In mature friendship, this listening becomes a potential space where the unsaid, the uncertain, and the vulnerable can unfold. When it is not conditioned by need or utility, friendship constitutes an experience of symbolic gratuitousness. It does not seek validation or reward. It does not respond to a logic of debt, merit, or equivalence. Like love that has overcome the compulsion for completeness, it is sustained by the acceptance of imperfection, the renunciation of control, and the ability to accommodate the fragility of the other without interpreting it as a threat.
From a psychoanalytic perspective, therefore, friendship cannot be conceived as an accessory or merely affective bond. It is a relational structure that allows the subject to work through their drives, contain their aggression, and open themselves up to ways of coexisting that are not regulated by domination or strategic exchange. Being a friend, in the most rigorous sense, is not being indulgent or unconditional, but rather being capable of sustaining a bond in which the other does not appear as an extension of the self, but as a presence that destabilizes, challenges, and transforms.
Understood in this way, friendship does not numb, console, or save. Nor does it guarantee emotional stability or constant harmony. What it offers is a form of companionship that, without eliminating psychic conflict, makes it livable. In this shared journey, completeness is not achieved, but a form of presence that makes the fact of existing less inhospitable.
Prabhuji